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Abstract
Self-critical rumination is a process whereby individuals focus attention on past fail-
ures and inadequacies without consideration for improvement or problem-solving. 
Past research has demonstrated that self-critical rumination is a separate process 
from the experience of having intrusive self-critical thoughts and that engaging in 
self-critical rumination is strongly correlated with beliefs that it is uncontrollable 
or represents a weakness of character. What is less clear at this time, however, is 
the impact that self-critical rumination has on levels of distress when faced with 
failure. Thirty volunteers who were not experiencing significant levels of depres-
sion were randomly assigned across three groups: one rumination and two controls. 
Acute distress was measured prior to and immediately following a task, as well as 
upon debrief. Individuals expected to complete an impossible task, who experi-
enced simulated self-critical rumination experienced greater levels of acute distress 
than controls immediately following the task. There was also a significant correla-
tion between reported levels of trait self-critical rumination, negative metacognitive 
beliefs and self-esteem with levels of distress following debrief when controlling for 
initial levels of distress and group membership. The use of subjective self-reports 
and small sample size limits the findings of this exploratory study. Engaging in self-
critical rumination, and associated negative metacognitive beliefs, may have a sig-
nificant impact on levels of acute distress following a recent failure.
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Introduction
Self‑Criticism and Self‑Critical Rumination
Self-criticism is an intense and persistent form of internal dialogue that expresses 
hostility toward the self when one is unable to attain one’s own high stand-
ards (Shahar 2015). Having both state and trait components, the tendency to be 
self-critical has been identified as a transdiagnostic risk factor for several men-
tal health disorders, including mood disorders, anxiety disorders, eating disor-
ders and personality disorders (Blatt et  al. 1976; McIntyre et  al. 2018; Warren 
et al. 2016; Zuroff et al. 1999, 2016). This may be due to subjective experiences 
of entrapment and the tendency to engage in negative social comparison (Stur-
man and Mongrain 2005) or as a way of punishing oneself or correcting one’s 
behavior (Gilbert et al. 2004). Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that apart 
from emotional distress, self-criticism can also lead to impairments in long-term 
adjustment and can have a negative impact on interpersonal relationships (Mon-
grain et al. 1998; Zuroff et al. 1994). Previous research has suggested that there is 
a moderate to strong negative correlation between self-criticism and explicit self-
esteem, which is the evaluation that one makes of their own self-worth (Dunkley 
and Grilo 2007; Grzegorek et al. 2004; Shahar 2015). Similarly, individuals with 
low self-esteem are more likely to engage in greater levels of self-criticism. This 
could reinforce their view of not being good enough, which could increase levels 
of self-esteem (Fennell 1997).
Recently, researchers have started to explore the role that the process of rumi-
nation plays in maintaining levels of self-critical thinking, distress and self-
esteem (Kolubinski et al. 2017; Moreira and Canavarro 2018; Smart et al. 2016). 
Rumination is the process of perseveratively thinking about one’s emotions or 
problems without actively problem-solving. Its presence is a distinguishing fea-
ture between individuals with low and high levels of self-esteem (Di Paula and 
Campbell 2002; Nolen-Hoeksema et al. 2008; Treynor et al. 2003). The process 
of rumination can also contain state-based and trait-based components (LeMoult 
et al. 2013; Moberly and Watkins 2008, 2010; Nolen-Hoeksema 1991). The for-
mer refers to a momentary cognitive experience of engaging with emotionally-
laden thoughts without problem-solving; whereas the latter indicates a propensity 
to do so frequently at various points over a longer period of time. Rumination 
can be applied to content-based thoughts related to anger, depression, post-event 
processing, and worry, which in turn can impact behavior and intensity of affect 
(Baer and Sauer 2011; Brozovich and Heimberg 2011, 2013; Bushman et  al. 
2005; Rector et al. 2008; Sukhodolsky et al. 2001; Treynor et al. 2003).
Unlike self-reflection, which is meant to involve an inquisitive self-appraisal 
for the benefit of developing greater awareness and understanding, rumination has 
a brooding aspect to it that facilitates neither learning nor improvement (Trapnell 
and Campbell 1999). Smart et  al. (2016) postulated that trait self-critical rumi-
nation is the process of focusing attention specifically on self-critical thoughts 
and past instances of failure rather than attempting to improve oneself or one’s 
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circumstances. The Trapnell and Campbell model of rumination, they suggest, 
may be considered self-focused, but is not necessarily self-critical.
Additionally, unlike depressive rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow 1991), 
the focus, or content, of self-critical thoughts are transdiagnostic and may involve 
feelings of shame and guilt (Smart et  al. 2016). Furthermore, Kolubinski et  al. 
(2019) have demonstrated that engaging in self-critical rumination might not be the 
same as being self-critical. Indeed, the process of self-critical rumination appears to 
partially mediate the relationship between self-criticism and self-esteem.
Where most research to date has explored the role of self-criticism in predicting 
well-being, it may be more beneficial to understand the process with which indi-
viduals engage with self-critical thoughts. By understanding the mechanisms that 
activate and maintain the ruminative process, it would be possible to approach self-
critical thoughts with the intent to shift from rumination to reflection.
Self‑Critical Rumination and Metacognitions
A theoretical framework that could be used to explain trait-based self-critical rumi-
nation is the Self-Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model (Wells and Mat-
thews 1996). In this model, emphasis is placed not on the content of one’s intru-
sive thoughts and experiences, but rather on the mechanisms that generate, monitor 
and maintain the process of worry and rumination (Wells 2009). According to this 
model, psychological distress is linked to the activation of a particularly toxic style 
of responding to negative intrusive thoughts consisting of worry, rumination, threat 
monitoring, thought suppression and avoidance. This style of responding, referred to 
as the Cognitive Attentional Syndrome (CAS), is initiated and maintained through 
metacognitions, which are the beliefs that we hold about our cognitive experiences 
and ways to control and manage them.
In accordance with the S-REF model, Kolubinski et  al. (2016, 2017) identified 
that positive and negative metacognitions are involved in self-critical rumination, 
as have been identified in other emotional, physical and behavioral domains (Caselli 
and Spada 2013; Fernie et al. 2015, 2017; Nikčević et al. 2017; Papageorgiou and 
Wells 2001a; Spada and Wells 2006). In this model, positive metacognitions refer 
to beliefs linked to the activation of the ruminative process (e.g. ‘I need to repeat-
edly think about things that I got wrong in order to avoid making mistakes in the 
future’) and negative metacognitions concern the potential danger and uncontrol-
lability of ruminating once it is initiated (e.g., ‘Dwelling on my past mistakes rep-
resents a weakness of character’ and ‘I find it hard to focus on anything else when I 
think about my past mistakes and failures’). This apparent contradiction between the 
benefits and dangers of self-critical rumination first activates, and then maintains, 
the CAS and can lead to an increase in emotional distress (Wells 2009; Wells and 
Matthews 1996).
However, unlike previous research into the role of metacognitions, self-critical 
rumination and the negative metacognitions associated with it appear to be related 
to the same construct (Kolubinski et al. 2019). Indeed, the Self-Critical Rumination 
Scale developed by Smart et al. (2016), for example contains items such as ‘I often 
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worry about all of the mistakes I have made’ and ‘My attention is often focused on 
aspects of myself that I’m ashamed of,’ which are a reflection of the process of self-
critical rumination. However, it also contains items that assess metacognitive beliefs 
(e.g., ‘Sometimes it is hard for me to shut off critical thoughts about myself’).
Aims and Objectives
Experiencing state-level self-critical rumination is an emotionally distressing expe-
rience in the moment. Previous research by Koster et al. (2013) reported that rumi-
nation can significantly impair one’s ability to switch the focus of attention when 
faced with negatively-charged emotional information. Furthermore, they demon-
strated that rumination, particularly the tendency to brood, is strongly correlated 
(r = .63, p < .01) with the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger 1983). There-
fore, it could be the case that experiencing trait-levels of self-critical rumination 
may increase the impact of state-level rumination and maintain elements of that dis-
tress after the task is complete, since it takes longer for ruminators to shift the focus 
of attention away from the emotional task.
To date, most research into the effects of self-critical rumination has been cor-
relational, based on self-report measures of trait rumination linking it to affective 
states. This has included depression, shame or stress (Moreira and Canavarro 2018; 
Smart et  al. 2016) and also to levels of self-esteem (Kolubinski et  al. 2017). No 
research has explored the direct emotional impact that state-based self-critical rumi-
nation might cause when faced with failing a task or how that might interact with 
trait-based rumination.
The purpose of this study was to undertake an experiment to explore the effect of 
self-critical rumination on acute levels of distress, which we define as a self-reported 
level of emotional discomfort. The experimental hypotheses put forward are that: (a) 
manufactured self-critical rumination will lead to significantly higher levels of dis-
tress during an impossible task when expectations of performance are not managed; 
and (b) there will be a positive relationship between the level of distress with each 
of the self-reported levels of trait self-critical rumination, the associated negative 
metacognitions and self-esteem. This is expected to be true immediately following 
the task, as well as after the debrief.
Method
Participants
Thirty student volunteers (26 female; mean age = 24.6  years [SD = 6.04; range 
18–38 years]) were recruited among the student body at a university in London, UK. 
Some participants were provided with research credit as a part of their studies in 
psychology. Others were given an Amazon gift card. Participants were required to: 
(1) be at least 18 years of age; and (2) not be experiencing symptoms of depression 
in the moderate to severe range. The racial background of participants was 33.3% 
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Caucasian, followed by 23.3% Asian; 16.7% Black British, 6% White Other; 3.3% 
African; and 3.3% Other.
Using G*Power (Version 3.1.9.4; Faul et  al. 2009), the research team deter-
mined a priori that this sample size would provide us with enough statistical power 
(1-beta = .80; alpha = .05) to detect a moderate effect (.3) for a repeated-measures 
ANOVA in support of our first hypothesis and any strong bivariate correlations sim-
ilar to that found by Koster et  al. (2013; r = .6), mentioned above, to support our 
second hypothesis. This is further supported by Bujang and Baharum (2016), who 
report that 19 participants would be a sufficient sample size to detect a correlation 
of .6.
Measures
Negative Affect
The short form of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-21; Antony et  al. 
1998) is a 21-item measure using a 4-point Likert scale that assesses emotional dis-
tress in clinical and non-clinical populations. The DASS-21 distinguishes between 
depression (“I couldn’t seem to experience any positive feeling at all”), physiologi-
cal arousal (“I felt I was close to panic”) and psychological agitation (“I found it 
hard to wind down”). It contains three orthogonal factors (depression (DASS-D), 
anxiety (DASS-A) and stress (DASS-S) as well as an overall factor of psychological 
distress (DASS-T) (Henry and Crawford 2005). For the purpose of this study, we 
used a cut-off score of 14 on the depression subscale to determine eligibility for the 
study, which ruled out anyone in the moderate to severe range of depression. It has 
excellent reliability in this sample (alpha = .90).
Current Perceived Distress Levels
Current perceived distress was assessed using a visual analogue scale, ranging of 0 
(No Distress) to 10 (Unbearable Distress). Participants were shown a number-line 
and asked to rate how emotionally uncomfortable they were feeling in that moment. 
A similar method has been used in previous research when exploring the role of 
desire thinking on distress with respect to alcohol use (Caselli et al. 2013, 2016a, b).
Self‑Critical Rumination
The Self-Critical Rumination Scale (SCRS; Smart et al. 2016) assesses the rumina-
tive process associated with self-critical thoughts (“My attention is often focused 
on aspects of myself that I’m ashamed of”). This is a 10-item measure that uses a 
4-point Likert scale, has good internal consistency in this sample (alpha = .82) and 
correlates highly with measures of self-criticism as well as measures of rumination 
(Smart et al. 2016).
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Metacognitions About Self‑Critical Rumination
The Metacognitions about Self-Critical Rumination Questionnaire (MSCRQ; 
Kolubinski et al. 2017) is a 10-item measure using a 4-pont Likert scale to assess 
the positive (MSCRQ-P; “I motivate myself to try harder by dwelling on stupid 
things I did in the past”) and negative (MSCRQ-N; “I have a hard time distancing 
myself from thoughts about not being good enough”) metacognitions associated 
with self-critical rumination. Both sets of metacognitions are predictive of the 
process of self-critical rumination, and the MSCRQ-N has a particularly strong 
relationship with the SCRS (Kolubinski et al. 2019). Inter-item reliability for this 
questionnaire was low (alpha = .57).
Self‑Esteem
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Questionnaire (RSES; Rosenberg 1965) is a widely-
used measurement of self-esteem. It is a 10-item measure using a 4-point Lik-
ert scale focusing on feelings of self-worth (“On the whole, I am satisfied with 
myself”). The RSES has demonstrated acceptable reliability in this sample 
(alpha = .66) and validity has been established across many sample groups around 
the world (Robinson et al. 1991; Schmitt and Allik 2005).
Design
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental attention-focus 
groups: Math (Experimental), and two control groups (Math (Control) and Col-
oring (Control)), where each group contained an equal number of participants 
(N = 10). This study utilized a 3 × 3 mixed-design experiment, where measure-
ments were taken prior to the manipulation task (T1), immediately following the 
task (T2) and then again after debrief (T3) for each of the three manipulation 
groups.
Procedure
Ethics approval for the study was obtained from the London South Bank University 
Research Ethics Committee Board. After participants had given written informed 
consent, they were initially asked to describe their current level of psychological 
distress on a visual analogue scale, ranging from 0 to 10. They then completed the 
battery of self-report measures.
The Math (Experimental) group and Math (Control) group were given ten math-
ematics problems, each with an answer provided. Participants were asked to ‘show 
their work’ by writing down the process by which the answers are derived. Eight 
of the questions were calculable with a moderate level of numeracy using common 
techniques taught in secondary school. Certain failure was ensured by utilizing two 
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additional questions that were extremely difficult to complete, despite appearing to 
be straightforward.
In order to manufacture self-critical rumination, two tactics were employed. Pri-
marily, the experimental group were told that most people can solve all ten questions 
in approximately 15 min and that they would be given 10 to do so, thus raising their 
expectations of themselves. The Math (Control) group, however, were told that these 
questions were next to impossible and that if they struggle, it would be advisable to 
skip to the next question. It was expected that failing a task in which one is expected 
to succeed would increase state levels of self-critical rumination.
Additionally, all participants were asked to record a short audio clip, lasting 
15–20 s. Those in the Math (Experimental) group were asked to record a clip that 
reflected common self-critical thoughts in order to manufacture the experience of 
self-critical rumination (“What’s the matter with you? Can’t you do anything right? 
Everyone else can do this, so why can’t you? You’re pathetic. I mean, just really 
worthless. It’s not even that hard. You should be able to do this, and I don’t know 
why you can’t”). Meanwhile, participants in the Math (Control) group were asked to 
record the first paragraph from Charles Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities. (“It was the 
best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of 
foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the sea-
son of Light, it was the season of Darkness.”). This passage was chosen because it 
can be challenging to read at first sight but does not contain the emotional valence of 
the previous paragraph. The recordings were played approximately every 2 min over 
headphones that they were asked to wear. In order to control for the effects of facing 
failure, a second control group, Coloring (Control) was employed. They were given 
10 min to color in a picture with pencil crayons. They also had the recording of the 
Tale of Two Cities play over headphones every 2 min.
Immediately following the respective tasks, participants in each of the three 
groups were again asked to rate their level of distress on the visual analogue scale. 
Participants were then debriefed, the purpose of the study was explained, and par-
ticipants were provided with the contact details of the university’s Mental Health 
and Wellbeing Team and Samaritans in case participation produced any lasting level 
of distress. They were then shown a short video that involved an unrelated counting 
task. Lastly, they were asked to rate their level of distress one final time.
Data Analysis
See Table 1 for a summary of the means, standard deviations and ranges of the vari-
ous measurements. There were no reported differences between the groups on any 
of the measures. A series of Shapiro–Wilk tests were conducted to test the assump-
tion of normality using SPSS (Version 21; IBM Corp 2012). These concluded that 
level of distress at T1 (prior to intervention) and T3 (following debrief) were not 
normally distributed, most likely due to floor effects, so a nonparametric method 
was used to determine the effect of the experimental manipulation. We chose the 
F1 LD F1 nonparametric procedure for longitudinal data in the nparLD package 
(Noguchi et al. 2012) for R (R Core Team 2013), followed by Kruskal–Wallis and 
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Tukey–Kramer–Nemenyi tests post hoc using the PMCMR package in R (Pohlert 
2014) in order to test hypothesis 1.
In order to understand the relationship between self-critical rumination and lev-
els of acute distress (hypothesis 2), correlations were calculated using the Math 
(Experimental) and Math (Control) groups only. It was not expected that the levels 
of distress for the Coloring (Control) group would be insightful at this time, but that 
those in the Math (Control) group would be, since individuals in that group were 
also involved in an impossible task. To control for the level of distress at different 
points in time, partial Spearman correlations were calculated, controlling for group 
membership and distress level at T1.
Results
Nonparametric Analysis of Variance Between Groups
The nonparametric analysis of variance indicated that there was a significant dif-
ference between groups (F = 3.88, df = 1.79, p < .05) and across time (F = 19.91, 
df = 1.84, p < .01). There was also a significant interaction effect between the two 
(F = 4.69, df = 3.03, p < .01) (see Fig. 1). Kruskal–Wallis tests were then performed 
on each of the three periods in time, using a Bonferroni adjustment. Results indi-
cated that there was a significant difference between groups at T2 (H(2) = 14.427, 
p < .01), but neither at T1 (H(2) = 3.79, n.s.) nor T3 (H(2) = 4.66, n.s.). Therefore, 
a Tukey–Kramer–Nemenyi test was performed to determine group differences only 
for T2. Results indicated that distress levels for the Math (Experimental) group (6.8) 
Table 1  Means, SDs, and ranges 
for all questionnaires
T1 Distress, Acute distress at time 1; T2 Distress, Acute distress at 
time 2; T3 Distress, Acute distress at time 3; MSCRQ-P, Metacog-
nitions about Self-Critical Rumination Scale (Positive); MSCRQ-
N, Metacognitions about Self-Critical Rumination Scale (Nega-
tive); SCRS, Self-Critical Rumination Scale; RSES, Rosenberg 
Self-Esteem Scale; DASS-D, Depression, Anxiety Stress Scale-21 
(Depression); DASS-A, Depression, Anxiety Stress Scale-21 (Anxi-
ety); DASS-S, Depression, Anxiety Stress Scale-21 (Stress); n = 20
Means SD Range
1. T1 Distress 2.00 1.80 0–5
2. T2 Distress 4.37 2.55 0–8
3. T3 Distress 2.12 1.88 0–6
4. MSCRQ-P 8.73 2.63 5–14
5. MSCRQ-N 11.00 2.45 6–15
6. SCRS 23.37 5.67 13–34
7. RSES 29 3.53 22–35
8. DASS-D 5.57 4.30 0–13
9. DASS-A 5.97 4.55 0–18
10. DASS-S 9.5 5.43 0–21
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were significantly higher than the Math (Control) group (3.4) and Coloring (Con-
trol) group (2.9), p < .01, which were not significantly different from each other.
Correlations Between Time and Measurements
Level of anxiety was moderately correlated with level of distress at T2 (rs = .45, 
p < .05), but none of the other measurements were. At T3, level of distress was mod-
erately correlated with reported levels of self-critical rumination (rs = .42, p < .05) 
and strongly correlated with negative metacognitions about self-critical rumination 
(rs = .62, p < .01) and self-esteem (rs = − .60, p < .01) (see Table 2).
Discussion
The goal of this study was to explore the impact of state and trait levels of self-crit-
ical rumination on acute distress when faced with a challenging task and the results 
partially support the hypotheses set prior to the study. The findings show that manu-
factured state-level self-critical rumination had a significant impact on acute levels 
of distress during a challenging task, as described in our first hypothesis. Namely, 
participants experienced higher levels of reported distress in the group that manu-
factured self-critical rumination than in the groups that did not and that this distress 
can be better accounted for the difference in expectation rather than the experience 
of failure. There was also a relationship between a priori self-reported levels of trait 
Fig. 1  Ratings of acute distress before (Time 1 [1]) and after (Time 2 [2]) manipulation and after the 
debrief (Time 3 [3])
 D. C. Kolubinski et al.
1 3
self-critical rumination, negative metacognitions about self-critical rumination and 
levels of self-esteem with levels of distress after debriefing participants on the pur-
pose of the study. This partially supported the second part of our second hypothesis. 
However, that relationship was not statistically significant immediately following the 
task. Possible explanations for this include the possibility that the audio recording 
used to simulate self-critical rumination may have caused a level of distress that was 
disproportionate to one’s everyday experience of self-critical rumination. It could 
also be that there is less variation across the population on levels of distress when 
undergoing a near-impossible task or failure. It is also possible that the sample size 
used in this study did not have enough statistical power to be able to detect a weak or 
moderate correlation. Lastly, the level of distress immediately following a task was 
correlated with levels of anxiety, which may be more concerned with predicted con-
sequences of failing, as opposed to ruminating about past experiences. At this time, 
then, we cannot conclude that levels of self-reported trait self-critical rumination 
impact that distress caused by state self-critical rumination.
In any case, once participants were debriefed about the purpose of the study, and 
attention was diverted an unrelated topic, levels of acute distress were moderately 
correlated with one’s self-reported level of trait self-critical rumination and strongly 
correlated with the negative metacognitive beliefs and levels of self-esteem. There 
was no reported relationship between level of affect and distress at this time. There 
may be a difference in the amount of time that it would take one to return to base-
line, as a function of one’s tendency to ruminate, however, which could be ascer-
tained in future research.
The S-REF model is central to Metacognitive Therapy (MCT), which has 
been successfully applied to the treatment of depression and anxiety (Normann 
et  al. 2014; Wells 2009) and has been proven useful to help understand the pro-
cesses involved in problem drinking (Caselli and Spada 2013; Spada and Wells 
2006), problem gambling (Spada et al. 2014), nicotine use (Nikčević et al. 2017), 
Table 2  Partial Spearman correlations when controlling for group and level of distress at T1
*p < .05; **p < .01; T2 Distress, Acute distress at time 2; T3 Distress, Acute distress at time 3; MSCRQ-
P, Metacognitions about Self-Critical Rumination Scale (Positive); MSCRQ-N, Metacognitions about 
Self-Critical Rumination Scale (Negative); SCRS, Self-Critical Rumination Scale; RSES, Rosenberg 
Self-Esteem Scale; DASS-D, Depression, Anxiety Stress Scale-21 (Depression); DASS-A, Depression, 
Anxiety Stress Scale-21 (Anxiety); DASS-S, Depression, Anxiety Stress Scale-21 (Stress); n = 20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. T2 Distress
2. T3 Distress .18
3. MSCRQ-P .06 .05
4. MSCRQ-N .39 .62** .25
5. SCRS .34 .41* .21 .71**
6. RSES − .18 − .60** .00 − .71** − .53*
7. DASS-D .12 .02 .19 .45* .37 − .14
8. DASS-A .45* .19 .07 .48* .48* − .28 .63**
9. DASS-S .26 .10 − .02 .16 .25 − .10 .54* .77**
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procrastination (Fernie and Spada 2008) and depressive rumination (Papageorgiou 
and Wells 2001a, b). In MCT, Wells (2009) draws a distinction between two differ-
ent modes of processing thoughts: object mode and metacognitive mode. In object 
mode, thoughts are processed in a similar fashion as sensory stimuli. Both inner and 
outer events are treated equally in an undifferentiated consciousness. However, in the 
metacognitive mode, thoughts are consciously perceived as being separate from the 
self-as-observer and can instead be processed by the individual to facilitate objective 
evaluation. Individuals in MCT are also challenged on the veracity of their positive 
and negative metacognitions, which activate and maintain the rumination process.
This model may be beneficial to help individuals to analyze their performance, 
failures and mistakes in order to move towards what Kross (2009) referred to as 
a self-distanced perspective rather than a self-immersed perspective. Indeed, Kross 
and colleagues have demonstrated that the manner in which one views oneself 
during introspection can have a significant impact on their ability to regulate their 
thoughts, feelings and behavior (Ayduk and Kross 2010; Kross et al. 2014). Simi-
larly, Trapnell and Campbell (1999) also distinguish between rumination and reflec-
tion when engaging in introspection. When discussing introspection, however, nei-
ther of these models address the role of self-criticism or denigration that may follow 
a failure.
This study provides evidence to suggest that MCT might be a useful form of 
treatment for individuals who report experiencing high levels of self-critical rumina-
tion. The effects that were demonstrated in this study were done using a sample of 
individuals who were not concurrently experiencing symptoms of depression, which 
is often associated with the process of rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema 2004). Rather 
than operating in object mode with respect to self-critical thoughts, individuals 
could shift into metacognitive mode through techniques such as Detacahed Mindful-
ness and Situation Attention Refocusing (Gkika and Wells 2015; Wells 2000).
Study Limitations and Future Directions
Several limitations must be considered when interpreting the results of this study. 
First is the use of self-report measures, which are subject to response biases and 
demand effects. Similarly, the measure of acute distress was also self-reported using 
a subjective scale with unknown reliability and validity and it is difficult to compare 
results across participants.
Second was the low sample size used in this study, which can increase the 
likelihood of false positives and false negatives. Although significant results were 
ascertained, the stability of the positive results is tenuous. On the other hand, 
one of the hypotheses could not be confirmed and a sampling error may have 
contributed to those that were. This could also explain why some of the relation-
ships between measures, particularly positive and negative metacognitions, were 
not statistically significant. Previous research has demonstrated a low-moderate 
correlation between the two subscales of the Metacognitions about Self-Criti-
cal Rumination Scale (Kolubinski et  al. 2017). Additionally, in this sample the 
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inter-item reliability was lower for the MSCRQ than had been demonstrated in 
previous studies (Kolubinski et al. 2019, 2017).
Third, this study was concerned with the level of distress that self-critical 
rumination might cause, but did not ascertain the impact that it could have on 
performance, since it did not measure the accuracy of the participants’ calcu-
lations. Future research will be required in order to determine impact, whether 
positive or negative. It has been shown that some individuals view their self-crit-
ical thoughts, or the process of self-critical rumination, as a way of improving 
performance and reducing future mistakes (Gilbert et al. 2004; Kolubinski et al. 
2016). However, this intended result may not materialize and it could instead 
have a negative impact on one’s self-efficacy (Mahoney and Avener 1977; Stoe-
ber et al. 2008). When asking participants to solve an impossible anagram task, 
for example, Sommer and Baumeister (2002) concluded that individuals with low 
self-esteem were less likely to persist. Similarly, when primed with words that 
suggested rejection, individuals with low self-esteem performed worse than those 
with high self-esteem.
Lastly, the use of a recording to simulate self-critical rumination in addition to 
the management of expectations brings the generalizability into question. Future 
research could compare differences between those who report high and low levels 
of self-critical rumination in order to better understand the role that the natural 
tendency to ruminate might have on distress. Similarly, it would be useful to tease 
out the difference in effect that the expectations and the recording had on levels 
of distress. Future research may wish to consider incorporating a fourth group to 
distinguish between the two interventions. This could be particularly useful in the 
study of perfectionism and contingencies of self-worth (Crocker and Wolfe 2001; 
Egan et al. 2011).
Conclusions
Evidence suggests that self-critical rumination might be a transdiagnostic subtype 
of the ruminative process, related to levels of self-esteem and feelings of shame, 
and separate from other established forms of rumination. This study indicates that 
it could lead to levels of distress following a potential failure or sub-optimal per-
formance. Previous research has found that the strongest predictor of self-critical 
rumination is the presence of negative metacognitive beliefs that engaging in this 
process is either dangerous or uncontrollable (Kolubinski et al. 2017). This could 
mean that engaging in such a process is a function of the belief that doing so is 
dangerous or that it is impossible not to. From this perspective, Metacognitive 
Therapy, based on the S-REF model, could help individuals in the sub-clinical 
population who may be experiencing acute distress following a perceived failure.
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